Gasoline: From Rationing to Social Explosion in Iran
A Political, Economic, and Social Analysis of the Consequences of the New Policy Adopted by Iran’s Ruling Regime
By: Kurosh Iravani
Abstract
In recent days, gasoline has once again become one of Iran’s most pressing economic and social issues. This time, however, the regime has entered the arena with two simultaneous blows: it has raised gasoline prices while also introducing a plan to collect fuel station operators’ emergency fuel cards, effectively turning a serious fuel shortage into a form of covert rationing.
This article explains why the new plan is not merely an administrative change to fuel cards, but rather a sign that the regime is running out of resources to finance, import, and produce fuel. Drawing on the bitter experience of the November 2019 uprising, the policy is being implemented gradually and on a trial basis. Yet, because of the cascading effects of rising prices and shortages on virtually all goods, the regime will inevitably face waves of social unrest.
Introduction: Gasoline Returns to the Forefront of Iran’s Crises
In Iran, gasoline has never been just another commodity. It affects the price of bread, taxi fares, fruit and vegetables, freight costs, and even the cost of an ordinary intercity journey. That is why every time the regime has intervened in gasoline prices or rationing, it has sparked protests.
In November 2019, an overnight price shock triggered the largest street uprising in Iran in recent decades. Now, the regime claims that it has learned from that experience and does not want to impose another “shock.” But the question remains: Can the same consequences of a sudden shock be imposed on the population gradually, drop by drop, while expecting no protests to erupt? The new gasoline policy is the regime’s answer to this question.
From Unlimited Access to a 160-Liter Cap: What Exactly Is the New Plan?
Three Price Tiers, One Monthly Cap, and the End of Unrestricted Gasoline
Under the previous rationing system, private vehicles were entitled to 60 liters of gasoline at 1,500 tomans per liter and another 50 liters at 3,000 tomans per liter. Beyond that, motorists could purchase as much gasoline as they wanted at the unrestricted rate of 10,000 tomans per liter. Fuel stations’ emergency cards also allowed people to refuel even without their personal fuel cards.
The new plan reverses this arrangement.
Under the new policy, which began on November 1, 2026, in 11 provinces, emergency fuel cards at service stations are being collected and restricted. In their place, an additional 50 liters of gasoline at the third-tier rate of 10,000 tomans per liter are being added to each vehicle’s personal fuel card.
As a result, each vehicle can consume only 160 liters of gasoline per month across three price tiers:
- 60 liters at 1,500 tomans per liter;
- 50 liters at 3,000 tomans per liter;
- 50 liters at 10,000 tomans per liter.
The total cost of these 160 liters amounts to 740,000 tomans. Beyond this limit, gasoline at the 10,000-toman rate is no longer available.
According to announcements by official media outlets, the provinces included in the first phase are Hormozgan, East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Razavi Khorasan, North Khorasan, South Khorasan, Ardabil, Yazd, Kurdistan, Kerman, and Sistan and Baluchestan.
The regime claims that fuel station cards have not been completely eliminated and that emergency cards will remain available at certain designated stations. In practice, however, public access to unrestricted fuel has been severely curtailed.
160 Liters for an Entire Month? A Calculation That Does Not Add Up for Drivers
When a Monthly Allocation Covers Only a Few Days of Consumption
This raises the central question of the plan: For commercial drivers, passenger transport operators, freight carriers, and app-based taxi drivers, how many days of a month can 160 liters actually cover?
A driver operating on the Minab–Bandar Abbas route, an intercity taxi driver, or a freight pickup driver can consume more than an entire week’s allocation during a single ordinary working day.
The government’s official answer to this question, in practice, is a bitter one: Go and buy premium gasoline on the unrestricted market.
According to the National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company, the price of each liter of domestically produced premium gasoline was set at between 103,000 and 110,000 tomans in November 2026. This rate is adjusted monthly according to the Persian Gulf Free On Board (FOB) price.
This gasoline is supplied without rationing and without quantity restrictions, and is available at between 70 and 84 fuel stations across the country. Some reports, including reports from Isfahan, have even put its price at 140,000 tomans per liter.
In this way, the unrestricted gasoline price has effectively and through an overt deception jumped from 10,000 tomans to more than 100,000 tomans per liter—a rise of more than tenfold.
For a driver who consumes several hundred liters of gasoline each month, this means that a 50-liter tank will cost more than 5 million tomans to fill, an amount entirely disproportionate to that driver’s monthly income.
Gradual, Incremental Implementation: What the Regime Learned from November 2019
Why Is the Regime Avoiding Another Sudden Shock?
The regime learned from the 2019 uprising that it should avoid imposing a sudden “shock.” For this reason, it is implementing the current plan in a controlled and gradual manner.
On November 12, the executive deputy to President Pezeshkian announced that emergency fuel cards at service stations had so far been collected in the provinces included in the first phase. He added that the process would gradually continue in other provinces over the coming weeks until it became nationwide.
The meaning of “gradually” in the regime’s political vocabulary is clear: testing the public’s reaction.
The regime’s logic is straightforward: If no protests occur in the 11 provinces, the plan will be declared nationwide. If protests erupt, implementation will be suspended or slowed down.
In other words, extending this plan across the country depends on monitoring the potential for social uprisings. This is precisely the element that was absent in November 2019 but has now become the regime’s principal strategy: instead of one major explosion, several smaller and supposedly manageable explosions.
Official Admission: “We Really Do Have a Supply Problem”
When the Regime Has Run Out of Resources
Perhaps the most important evidence presented in this article is the admission made by the regime’s own officials.
Esmail Saghab Esfahani, Vice President and Head of the Organization for Energy Optimization and Strategic Management, said in an interview with the newspaper Farhikhtegan, published on Wednesday, November 11, 2026:
“We really do have a supply problem… The conditions governing gasoline supply do not allow the government to provide whatever quantity of fuel is needed, as it did in the past.”
He also stated that the first-tier gasoline allocation could be saved for up to three months and that people should plan their fuel needs three months in advance before traveling. This remark triggered widespread criticism and ridicule on social media.
One particularly sarcastic reaction was:
“So now we can no longer say, ‘I’m going to Mashhad, and I might stop in Shahroud or somewhere else along the way.’”
This admission provides a revealing picture of the regime’s overall condition.
By the end of October 2026, Iran’s average daily gasoline consumption had reached approximately 133 million liters. Yet the regime lacks the capacity to produce sufficient gasoline at domestic refineries, the ability to import it at international prices, and the financial resources to compensate for the shortfall.
Put simply, the regime has run out of resources in every respect: financing fuel supplies, importing fuel, and producing sufficient quantities at domestic refineries.
The regime is living on the edge of an economic and social precipice, yet it is trying to maintain appearances through force, smoke and mirrors, and propaganda, so that the public does not recognize its weakness and take to the streets in protest and uprising.
The Ripple Effect: When Gasoline Prices Rise, Everything Becomes More Expensive
From Taxi Fares to the Price of Bread
Everyone knows that fuel price increases and shortages have cascading effects on the entire economy and affect the prices of virtually all goods.
Gasoline is not merely the fuel used by private cars. It is also the fuel consumed by trucks transporting wheat and fruit, buses carrying workers to factories, and generators keeping shops illuminated during power outages.
When drivers are forced to purchase gasoline at 110,000 tomans per liter, they pass this cost on through higher fares, increased freight charges, and ultimately higher prices for goods on ordinary people’s tables.
The regime may be able to manage official prices, but it cannot conceal actual market prices.
For this reason, even if the gasoline plan appears to be implemented gradually and calmly, it represents an inflationary shock deep within society.
This shock is being imposed at a time when people are already struggling with inflation, unemployment, and electricity and gas outages.
Gasoline is the final link that could push public endurance beyond its limits.
The First Sparks: From Minab to Bandar Abbas
A Protest That Could Spread
This analysis is not merely a prediction. The first reactions are already visible.
On Saturday, October 31, drivers of intercity passenger cars operating on the Minab–Bandar Abbas route gathered at Esteghlal Square in Minab. They stated that the 160-liter monthly allocation was entirely inadequate for their daily travel distances.
On the evening of Friday, November 13, residents of Bandar Abbas blocked a road by parking their vehicles in the vicinity of the Aftab-e Derakhshan fuel station in the Rajaei district. They were protesting gasoline shortages, the meager 20-liter allocations at some stations, and the failure of officials to fulfill their promises.
Reports of protests have also emerged from Shiraz, Isfahan, and Nurabad-e Mamasani.
These protests remain scattered for now, but their pattern is familiar: they begin at fuel stations, spill onto the streets, and spread to other cities.
This is precisely the kind of contagion the regime fears. That is why it has limited the initial implementation of the plan to a trial in border provinces and less densely populated regions.
Conclusion: The Regime May Be Able to Manage the Crisis, but It Cannot Escape the Inevitable Uprising
The gasoline issue is not merely an administrative change involving fuel cards.
The regime may be able to manage rising prices and shortages at a particular moment, but it cannot escape the social consequences of restricted access to fuel and the cascading effects that follow.
Perhaps, under the cover of war, repression, and gradual implementation, the regime may manage to weather this episode for a time. But there can be no doubt that fuel shortages, rising prices, and their cascading consequences will continue to haunt the regime.
Gasoline is pushing the needle closer to the breaking point of public endurance.
Every liter of gasoline priced at 110,000 tomans, every long queue at a fuel station, and every meager 20-liter allocation serves as a daily reminder that the regime can no longer even meet the population’s most basic needs.
In such circumstances, all it takes is another spark in another city for the flames of an uprising to be reignited—a fire that this time will begin at the fuel stations.

Kurosh Iravani
Writer, researcher and political analyst focusing on human rights, sociology of repression and protest movements in contemporary Iran. A long-time contributor to analytical media of the Iranian resistance, documenting extrajudicial executions and advocating practical international solidarity with the people of Iran.
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